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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumer lending has surged in countries across the globe in 
recent years.  Not surprisingly, consumer financial markets have ex-
panded most dramatically in developed economies, especially in the 
United States and the European Union.1  Some of the most dramatic 
changes in consumer borrowing, however, have occurred in the de-
veloping world.  In recent years, modern consumer financial markets 
have emerged or have begun emerging in nearly all middle-income 
and many lower-income countries as these countries have experi-
enced significant per capita growth in recent years.2  Total financial 
liabilities of households in India, for example, have increased nearly 
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 1 Between 1981 and early 2008, consumer lending in the United States increased 
from $353 billion to approximately $2.6 trillion, excluding loans secured by real es-
tate.  FEDERAL RESERVE, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE G.19 CONSUMER CREDIT 
(2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_sa.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 28, 2008).  Over the last two decades, household indebtedness in developed 
countries has increased at rates faster than growth in household incomes; as a result, 
debt-to-asset ratios have increased significantly across these economies. Guy Debelle, 
Household Debt and the Macroeconomy, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2004, at 52. 
 2 According to the World Bank, gross domestic product per capita nearly dou-
bled in Brazil in the period between 1986 and 2006, increasing from $4854 to $9054; 
in India, GDP per capita nearly quadrupled, increasing from $993 to $3827; and in 
China, that figure rose seven-fold in that period, increasing from $918 to $7660.  See 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d 
=CDB&f=srID%3a29922. 
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six-fold between 2000 and 2006.3  In Brazil, consumer lending more 
than doubled between 2003 and 2007, from $238 billion to $530 bil-
lion.4  Outstanding consumer credit in Mexico has grown by ap-
proximately thirty-five percent per year in recent years.5  Some of this 
global increase in consumer or household debt is due to the expan-
sion of microfinance in developing countries,6 but most appears to be 
the product of expanding conventional lending in nascent formal 
credit markets.  Consumers in developing countries are increasingly 
financing purchases of household durables and automobiles,7 and 
credit card penetration has surged across most of Western Europe, 
Asia, Russia, and South America.8  While total consumer lending in 
developing countries is relatively modest compared to similar lending 
in countries with more advanced economies, these emerging con-
sumer financial markets are increasingly significant, and they appear 
likely to continue growing at dramatic rates in coming years. 
While some writers have expressed concern about rising levels of 
indebtedness in developing countries,9 there has been surprisingly lit-
tle scholarship assessing the overall effects of the deepening of con-
 3 RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, CHANGES IN FINANCIAL ASSETS/LIABILITIES OF THE 
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR (2006), available at http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/publications 
view.aspx?id=8561.  Household liabilities during 2000 through 2001 were rupees 
(Rs.) 31,779 crore; in 2005 through 2006, the liabilities were Rs. 182,539 crore.  Id.  A 
crore is the Indian numbering equivalent of 10 million.  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 540 (1993).  As of January 2008, one dollar is worth ap-
proximately forty-eight rupees. 
 4 See Jack Chang, Banking, Consumer-Credit Boom Transforms Brazil, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/161/story/ 
27564.html. 
 5 See Anna Gelpern, Wal-Mart Bank in Mexico: Money to the Masses and the Home-
Host Hole, 39 CONN. L REV. 1513, 1515 (2007) (citing Jos J. Sidaoui, The Mexican Fi-
nancial System: Reforms and Evolution 1999–2000, in 28 BIS PAPERS 277, 289 (2006)). 
 6 See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 7 See, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT 2008, BRAZIL (2008), 
31–32; Akash Gupta & Rahul Agarwal, ‘The Consumer Financing Business in In-
dia’—Building Blocks for the Future 4–5, 7  (Dec. 8, 2004) (unnumbered working 
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=619721. 
 8 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Credit Cards Tighten Grip Outside U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 
2008, at A1. 
 9 See generally José Reinaldo de Lima Lopes, Consumer Bankruptcy and Over-
indebtedness in Brazil, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 85 (Johanna 
Niemi-Kiesilainen et al. eds., 2003); Xian-Chu Zhang, Development of Consumer Credit in 
China and Concerns about the Underlying Legal Infrastructure, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 105; Claudia L. Marques & Antonio H. Benjamin, 
Consumer Over-indebtedness in Brazil and the Need of a New Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Legislation 1 (July 25, 2007) (unnumbered working paper), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/7/5/4/p177
540_index.html; Soogeun Oh, Portrait of Personal Bankruptcy in Korea (2008) (on 
file with author). 
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sumer financial markets in the developing world.  There has been lit-
tle focus, for example, on whether and when expanding consumer 
financial markets might promote growth and development, whether 
some types of lending promote growth and development more than 
others, and whether or how policymakers should promote or restrain 
consumer lending in their countries.  This is particularly surprising 
because there is a rich and growing body of literature that explores 
the links between law, financial markets, economic growth, and de-
velopment.10  The various strands of this literature are broadly ac-
cepted as having established that legal institutions promote the deep-
ening of financial markets, which can in turn promote economic 
growth and development.11  This literature has been highly influen-
tial among policymakers in developing economies around the globe 
and within the international financial institutions that influence poli-
cies in the developing world, such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.12  Yet this literature has not addressed the 
question of whether deepening of consumer financial markets might 
promote such growth.  As Karlan and Zinman note, while there is 
consensus that financial deepening in general promotes growth and 
development, “[t]here is less consensus on the role of consumer 
credit in expansion initiatives.”13  This literature has also failed to ad-
dress whether regulation of consumer finance is part of the observed 
relationship between law, finance, and development. 
This Article argues that consumer financial markets, if effectively 
regulated, can play an important role in promoting growth and de-
velopment, especially in countries with rising per capita incomes.  By 
 10 See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra Part II.A. 
 12 See Joel M. Ngugi, The World Bank and the Ideology of Reform and Development in In-
ternational Economic Development Discourse, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 313, 313–23 
(2006); see also John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Devel-
opment Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 
243 (2007).  “References [in the 1990’s] to economist Douglass North's designation 
of law as an “institution” with important economic implications helped justify legal 
reform initiatives that went far beyond the scope of prior . . . initiatives, and the rule 
of law became the umbrella concept used to rhetorically unify a wide range of legal 
development initiatives.”  Id. at 253 (discussing the impact of law and finance litera-
ture on the World Bank); World Bank, About Us, http://web.worldbank.org 
/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040565~menuPK:169689
2~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (noting the importance 
of implementing “legal and judicial systems that encourage business, protect individ-
ual and property rights, and honor contracts”) (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). 
 13 Dean S. Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized 
Supply Decisions to Estimate Impacts 1 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 108, 
2007) (emphasis omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=982921.  
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way of illustration, it proposes that consumer bankruptcy can, under 
some circumstances, contribute to beneficial regulation of consumer 
finance in developing economies.  As Part II explains, there are good 
reasons to believe that the deepening of consumer financial markets 
can promote growth and development.  Most obviously, it can enable 
individuals and households to consume more of goods and services 
that directly improve their welfare.  The availability of consumer cre-
dit can make it easier for individuals to pursue self-employment or to 
become entrepreneurs; it can enable individuals to purchase durable 
goods, which may serve as a form of investment at the household lev-
el; it can provide individuals with a way to smooth consumption 
across income gaps, which should reduce private and social costs of 
income shocks; and it can increase demand for domestic goods and 
services.  Finally, borrowing may increase individuals’ personal in-
vestment in the overall performance of their country’s economy, the-
reby deepening consumers’ commitment to domestic development 
policies. 
Despite such potential beneficial effects, however, there are also 
costs and risks associated with consumer borrowing.  These include 
reduced domestic savings, inflation, and results of over-indebtedness.  
It is entirely possible that these costs might outweigh the benefits de-
scribed above in any particular context.  Moreover, while the benefits 
of expanding consumer lending are debatable, it is almost certain 
that at least some of these costs will accompany increasing consumer 
indebtedness.  This Article focuses on risks and costs associated with 
over-indebtedness.  Individuals who are over-indebted must allocate 
increasing amounts of income to servicing their obligations.  This 
undermines their ability to finance otherwise productive activity and, 
perhaps, their incentives to earn additional income.  They may ex-
perience acute emotional and physical stress, which can create a vari-
ety of other costs.  They may also be at increased risk for needing so-
cial assistance.  To the extent that consumers anticipate the risk of 
such results of indebtedness, they may be much less willing to borrow 
money in the first place, which will slow the deepening of financial 
markets.  Finally, as recent events in financial markets indicate, under 
some circumstances, widespread default and delinquency by over-
indebted individuals can weaken financial institutions and financial 
markets. 
Effective regulation of consumer finance can promote the bene-
ficial effects associated with consumer lending and reduce the atten-
dant risks and costs.  Part III argues that legal rules and legal institu-
tions can help expand consumer lending in emerging economies, 
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just as they can promote commercial lending and investment.  Basic 
legal institutions—high-quality judicial systems, stable property rights, 
and mechanisms to enforce contracts—are all presumably important 
preconditions for consumer finance, as they are for corporate fi-
nance.  More elaborate legal regimes enabling secured lending and 
debt collection may also help make consumer-lending relationships 
more predictable, thereby making consumer finance more accessible 
and less costly.  A wide range of laws and regulations affecting banks 
and other financial institutions can also help expand consumer lend-
ing.  These include increasing opportunities for bank branching, re-
ducing interest rate regulations, and liberalizing limits on foreign in-
vestment in the financial sector. 
Part III also argues that regulation of consumer finance should 
be especially concerned with limiting the costs of consumer financial 
distress and over-indebtedness.  A variety of legal regimes and policies 
are designed to address these costs, including, most notably, usury 
laws, disclosure requirements, financial education, laws prohibiting 
particular transactions or terms, limits on debt collection, and debt 
relief.14  Some of these rules and institutions may have more ambigu-
ous welfare effects than commercial investor or lender protections.  
For example, most substantive regulations of consumer lending, such 
as usury laws or property exemptions, are likely to increase the cost 
and/or reduce the availability of credit.15  In this respect, such regu-
lations have the potential to slow the development of consumer fi-
nancial markets.  Such rules and regimes are thus desirable only if 
their beneficial welfare effects outweigh their costs. 
This Article therefore implies that there is an optimal framework 
of regulation of consumer finance in developing economies.  It does 
not, however, aim to define such a framework.  Rather, in Part IV, 
this Article evaluates consumer bankruptcy as a particular form of 
 14 Such regimes and policies are discussed infra at notes 88–91 and accompany-
ing text. 
 15 See, e.g., Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Mar-
ket for Mortgage Loans, 42 J.L. & ECON. 809, 811–27  (1999); Reint Gropp, John Karl 
Scholz & Michelle White, Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 217, 245 (1997) (finding that more generous property exemptions are posi-
tively correlated with higher interest rates); Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemp-
tions, and Households With Nothing to Exempt, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 493, 504–17 (2006) 
(exploring the fact that exemptions affect the cost of credit for households that can-
not take advantage of those exemptions); see also Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, 
The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168, 170–97  (2002) 
(reviewing the literature on the effects of regulations of consumer finance on credit 
markets).  See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets 
with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
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regulation of consumer finance that may promote growth and devel-
opment.  It claims that an effective consumer bankruptcy regime can, 
under some circumstances, help reduce the costs of consumer lend-
ing ex post and can perhaps promote beneficial consumer lending ex 
ante.  Consumer bankruptcy law generally regulates debt collection 
by, among other things, staying at least some collection efforts once a 
debtor enters the bankruptcy system and by restructuring or dis-
charging some of the debtor’s obligations.  These aspects of bank-
ruptcy law can reduce direct private or public costs of delinquency 
and default as well as psychological or physical costs associated with 
debtors’ attempts to repay their obligations.  Restructuring or dis-
charging obligations effectively provides consumers with a form of in-
surance against income shocks (like unemployment), expense shocks 
(like acute health care costs), or poor forecasting of obligations and 
income.16  This insurance can ideally support the use of consumer 
credit to smooth consumption across periods of variable income and 
expenses and can improve the productivity of individuals who be-
come heavily indebted.17  It may also limit the dislocating effects of a 
rapidly evolving economy on individuals and households, which may 
help secure and maintain political support for a broader array of de-
velopment policies.18
Less obviously, consumer bankruptcy also has the potential to 
promote financial deepening in a variety of ways.  As an initial matter, 
a consumer bankruptcy regime with even limited debt relief can 
make risk-averse consumers more willing to borrow, which should 
expand demand for consumer lending.  Furthermore, depending on 
details of institutional design, a consumer bankruptcy regime may in-
crease creditors’ insolvency-state returns by enhancing their collective 
ability to enforce the obligations of their insolvent debtors.19  Even if 
a bankruptcy regime exposes creditors to the risk of discharge, it may 
still have a beneficial effect on consumer financial markets.  It can do 
so, for example, if it causes lenders to make more efficient decisions 
 16 See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129 n.2 (2005) (reviewing literature on 
the insurance function of consumer bankruptcy); Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh 
Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 
U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 97–109 (1986). 
 17 See Feibelman, supra note 16, at 140–41. 
 18 Assuming that such insurance is generally efficient, it might be justifiable as a 
mandatory form of social insurance if consumers will fail, or will be unable, to insure 
themselves privately.  See, e.g., Id. at 138. 
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
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in extending credit ex ante, thereby reducing the chances of default 
and insolvency in the first place. 
Assuming that consumer bankruptcy law has these potential 
benefits, it is puzzling that many developing countries have been slow 
or hesitant either to adopt consumer bankruptcy regimes or to mod-
ernize existing ones.  In fact, some of the largest, most dynamic de-
veloping economies do not have consumer bankruptcy regimes at all 
or have outdated regimes.20  Over the last decade or so, many coun-
tries have adopted or modernized domestic consumer bankruptcy re-
gimes, but most of these are countries with advanced economies.  
While some developing countries have recently modernized their 
consumer bankruptcy regimes or adopted new ones, most of these 
countries did so in response to disturbing levels of household over-
indebtedness.  Policymakers in these countries apparently believed—
rightly or wrongly—that consumer bankruptcy is an effective way to 
address the effects of such over-indebtedness ex post. 
The question remains why developing countries generally do not 
put such a regime in place before over-indebtedness becomes a sali-
ent problem or before a crisis occurs.  This may reflect weakness in 
the theoretical claim that there is an ex ante benefit to consumer 
bankruptcy.  It may reflect that such a regime will not help expand 
consumer financial markets because, for example, creditors may not 
actually recover more from insolvent consumers under a bankruptcy 
regime than they would absent one.  Perhaps more significantly, it 
may suggest that policymakers are concerned that a bankruptcy re-
gime with debt relief would harm nascent credit markets more than 
help them.  Policymakers may believe that creditors will be too hesi-
tant to lend to borrowers who can obtain relief from their obliga-
tions, especially if they think that borrowers may not try as hard to 
repay obligations subject to discharge.21  If that is the case, such a re-
gime would be unlikely to help expand consumer credit markets, 
even if it made borrowers more willing to borrow. 
Even if policymakers in developing countries are inclined to 
adopt or reform consumer bankruptcy laws, there may be practical 
obstacles to doing so.  Political factors, for example, may lean heavily 
against such regulatory innovation.  Powerful existing creditors may 
oppose extending bankruptcy relief to consumers regardless of 
whether doing so would help expand consumer financial markets.  
These creditors may do so, for example, if they cannot capture a sig-
 20 See infra notes 117–29 and accompanying text. 
 21 The potential moral hazard associated with debt relief is discussed infra at 
notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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nificant amount of the potential benefits of the new regime or if an 
expanding market would strengthen their competitors.  If such oppo-
sition arises, there is unlikely to be any organized constituency to 
counter-balance these interests.  Consumers and households are 
unlikely to clamor successfully for effective bankruptcy laws in the ab-
sence of widespread over-indebtedness.  Furthermore, at the current 
time, international financial institutions and other international ac-
tors are not pressuring policymakers in developing countries to con-
sider adopting or improving consumer bankruptcy regimes. 
Alternatively, policymakers in countries without a modern con-
sumer bankruptcy regime might believe that their societies are not 
institutionally or socially receptive to such a regime.22  This is a gen-
eral challenge for law reform efforts around globe.  Legal rules or in-
stitutions that are effective in one context or that hold promise in 
theory do not always work in new or different environments.  This 
may be due to a lack of necessary judicial or administrative infrastruc-
ture or to a lack of social demand for the reforms.  Thus, while the 
law and finance literature has generally established that investor and 
lender protections are correlated with higher rates of economic 
growth, many recent efforts to adopt or transplant such institutions 
have arguably failed to yield beneficial results.23  This could easily be 
the case with respect to consumer bankruptcy law.  Judicial or admin-
istrative capacity in some countries simply may not support a con-
sumer bankruptcy system.  This is especially true in countries that 
have struggled to create basic legal institutions and where administra-
tion of justice is very slow, unpredictable, or lacking legitimacy.  Also, 
a modern consumer bankruptcy system may fail to serve its functions 
in some societies because of insufficient social demand for the insti-
tution.  This may be due to the fact that debt relief or debt itself is 
disfavored or stigmatized in those societies.24  If individuals do not in-
cur credit in the first place, or if they are not willing to utilize a bank-
ruptcy regime, such a regime is unlikely to serve its potentially bene-
ficial functions. 
Despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm for consumer bank-
ruptcy law in the developing world, this Article proposes that such a 
regime can benefit most countries with rising per capita incomes and 
at least nascent consumer financial markets.  It proposes that these 
benefits are likely to be underestimated and that most practical ob-
stacles to implementing an effective regime are surmountable.  In 
 22 See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
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sum, on the broadest level, this Article aims to locate the regulation 
of consumer finance within the scope of scholarship on law, finance, 
and development by arguing that there is an important relationship 
between law, consumer finance, economic growth, and development.  
In particular, it argues that consumer bankruptcy with meaningful 
debt relief can under some circumstances be a key component of de-
velopment policy.  In theory, an effective consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem can both promote the beneficial expansion of consumer lending 
and reduce the costs of over-indebtedness.  Reforming or adopting 
consumer bankruptcy law is perhaps most beneficial in the wake of 
widespread over-indebtedness, but an effective bankruptcy regime 
might also help developing economies avoid at least some of these 
problems in the first place and help them build productive markets 
for consumer finance. 
II. CONSUMER FINANCE, GROWTH, AND DEVELOPMENT 
There is a significant body of literature on the relationship be-
tween financial deepening and economic growth, but this literature 
does not directly explore the effect of consumer finance on eco-
nomic growth and development.  Evaluating this effect is an ex-
tremely difficult enterprise, but it is a very important one as con-
sumer lending increases dramatically across the globe.  This Part 
examines these questions directly, locating consumer finance within 
the scope of the existing literature on finance, growth, and develop-
ment.  It proposes that deepening of consumer-financial markets has 
the potential to promote growth and/or development as well as the 
potential to create significant private and social costs.  These claims, 
if correct, suggest that development policy should directly address 
these potential costs and benefits of consumer borrowing. 
A. Finance and Growth 
Over the last two decades or so, scholars have become increas-
ingly interested in the link between deepening of financial markets 
and economic growth.  It has been somewhat challenging to confirm 
this link and even more challenging to show that financial deepening 
has a causal effect on growth.25  In recent years, however, a number of 
 25 See, e.g., RAGHURAM RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE 
CAPITALISTS 109 (2006); Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter 
Might Be Right, 108 Q.J. ECON. 717, 717 (1993) (citing JOAN ROBINSON, The Generaliza-
tion of the General Theory, in THE RATE OF INTEREST AND OTHER ESSAYS 67 (1952) and 
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3 
(1988)).  It is certainly possible to accumulate capital and assets without borrowing 
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economists have successfully established a correlation between finan-
cial deepening and broad indicators of economic growth.26  King and 
Levine, for example, found that financial development is “positively 
associated with faster rates of economic growth . . . .”27  More signifi-
cantly, they identified a relationship between financial development 
and subsequent rates of economic growth, leading them to conclude 
that finance has a causal effect on such growth.28 Rajan and Zingales 
reached similar conclusions by examining the growth of industries 
that are dependent on external financing.29  Such results provide 
strong evidence that financial development can fuel economic 
growth.30  The explanation for these results, however, is not self-
evident, and economists have endeavored to describe the mechanism 
by which finance can lead to growth.  According to Rajan and Zin-
gales, for example, financial deepening promotes growth in large 
part because it supports new market entrants and non-incumbents in 
an economy.31
money from intermediaries or obtaining it from investors.  Advancing economic 
growth could lead to increased savings, which could result in financial deepening (as 
savings are intermediated for investment and lending).  See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan 
& Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559, 559 (1998).  
Firms can finance expanding activities and innovations through cash flows or exist-
ing wealth.  See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra, at 108.  The recent dramatic economic 
growth in China, which has not enjoyed significant financial deepening, arguably 
provides anecdotal evidence that such deepening is not a necessary condition for 
growth.  Id. at 113.  Furthermore, there are reasons to think that some aspects of fi-
nancial deepening can actually be a drag on growth.  Financial services can be costly.  
They can also increase a society’s exposure to general economic risk and increase the 
potential for misallocation of resources.  Id. at 93–108, 122. 
 26 See, e.g., King & Levine, supra note 25, at 734–35; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 
25, at 584; Thorsten Beck et al., Finance, Inequality and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence 
2–3 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3338, 2004); Felix Eschenbach, Finance and 
Growth: A Survey of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature 13–22 (Tinbergen Inst., Dis-
cussion Paper No. TI 2004-039/2, 2004); see also RONDO CAMERON, BANKING IN THE 
EARLY STAGES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 2 (1967); Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The 
Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 639, 640–
41 (1996); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 
35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997) (summarizing theories of the relationship be-
tween finance and growth); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets and Economic 
Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1998) (finding that bank lending to the private sector 
promotes economic growth). 
 27 King & Levine, supra note 25, at 719. 
 28 See id. at 730, 735. 
 29 See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 112–13; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25, 
at 560, 584. 
 30 See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25, at 562. 
 31 Id. at 560.  According to this account, deepening of financial markets enables 
entrepreneurs and young firms to enter the marketplace and compete with more 
powerful, entrenched, and incumbent actors.  RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 
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It is important to note that if financial deepening promotes eco-
nomic growth, this does not necessarily mean that it also promotes 
broader indicators of development.  Development in the broadest 
sense involves, among other things, reductions in poverty and ine-
quality, increases in human capability, lowering of infant mortality 
rates, expansion of literacy, and improved protections for civil and 
human rights.32  The relationships between growth, poverty, and ine-
quality are complex.  While there is some significant evidence that 
broad economic growth helps the poor,33 growth can have lop-sided 
distributional effects, leading to more inequality within an econ-
omy.34  Thus, the existing finance and growth literature provides only 
121; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25, at 579, 584; see also Beck et al., supra note 26, at 
8.  There is some evidence, however, that in early stages of financial deepening, cre-
dit is more likely to flow to incumbents.  See, e.g., id. at 9.  Still, as a general matter, 
formal intermediaries are apparently more favorable to smaller, less experienced en-
trepreneurs than informal intermediaries.  See id. at 8; see also RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra 
note 25, at 36; Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram Rajan, The Effect of Credit Market 
Competition on Lending Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON. 407, 439–43 (1995).  “[F]inance in 
an underdeveloped system tends to be clubby, uncompetitive, and conservative . . . .”  
RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 45.  Develpoed systems disperse and allocate risk 
to those who are best equipped to hold it.  See id. 
 32 See, e.g., James M. Cypher & James L. Dietz, The Process of Economic Devel-
opment 30–57 (2d ed. 2004); Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality, Species 273–324 (2006); Amartya K. Sen, Development as Freedom 
(1999); see also Human Dev. Report Office, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, Human Development Report 2006, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
reports/global/hdr2006/ (“Human development is first and foremost about al-
lowing people to lead a life that they value and enabling them to realize 
their potential as human beings.”). 
 33 See, e.g., CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 32, at 30; Beck et al., supra note 26, at 2, 4, 
7; David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth is Good for the Poor, 7 J. ECON. GROWTH 195, 198 
(2002); Aart Kraay, When is Growth Pro-Poor?: Evidence from a Panel of Countries 2 
(Dec. 2004) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/INTPGI/Resources/15173_Kraay_PPG_Dec04.pdf); see also Philippe 
Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A Trickle-Down Theory of Growth and Development with Debt 
Overhang, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 151 (1997); Abhijit Banerjee & Andrew Newman, 
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development, 101 J. POL. ECON. 274, 274–77 
(1993); Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, 60 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 35, 37 (1993); George Clarke et al., Finance and Income Inequality: Test of 
Alternative Theories 1–2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2984, 
2002). 
 34 See, e.g., CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 32, at 28–56; Gender Issues in Economic Ad-
justment Discussed at U.N. Conference on Women, INT’L MONETARY FUND SURV., Sept. 25, 
1995 at 286–88.  In fact, under some circumstances, economic growth can exacerbate 
existing problems, especially those related to inequitable distribution of wealth.  See 
CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 32, at 53–56; Beck et al., supra note 26, at 2–3; see also Ti-
mothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Halving Global Poverty, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 7–9 
(2003); Martin Ravallion, Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages, 29 
WORLD DEV. 1803, 1808–10, 1812–13 (2001); Francois Bourguignon, The Pace of 
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indirect evidence that deepening financial markets promote impor-
tant factors of development. 
B. Consumer Finance 
While there is a growing consensus that financial deepening can 
promote economic growth, it is surprisingly unclear whether and 
when deepening of consumer financial markets can have this effect 
as well.35  In the studies noted above, financial deepening generally 
refers to the scope and depth of saving, investment, and extension of 
credit within an economy.36  Thus, these studies measure financial 
deepening as a function of the overall amount of capital intermedi-
ated by financial institutions.  There is no attempt made in the exist-
ing literature to isolate credit extended to consumers and its effect 
on economic growth.  It is thus possible that deepening of corporate 
financial markets is exclusively, or almost exclusively, driving the posi-
tive effects of finance on growth that these studies observe.  In fact, 
economists and development theorists tend to be ambivalent about 
the broad effects of consumption and consumer finance on an econ-
omy. Under some circumstances, consumption can act as a drag on a 
developing economy, primarily by undermining domestic saving.37  
Unfortunately, there has been surprisingly little empirical study of 
consumer finance in this context.38
Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 14–15 (Dec. 2000) (unnumbered working 
paper), available at http://www.lacea.org/meeting2001/bourguignon.pdf. 
 35 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and Financial Development, 26 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 271, 273–74 (2005); Karlan & Zinman, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
 36 King and Levine measure financial development as a function of the size of a 
country’s financial intermediary system, credit extended by banks, and credit alloca-
tion to private firms.  King & Levine, supra note 25, at 718.  In other words, their 
measures for financial depth are bank liabilities (savings), bank assets (loans), and 
loans to private firms.  See id. at 720–21.  Beck and his coauthors measure financial 
development as “the amount of savings intermediated to private borrowers relative to 
GDP.”  Beck et al., supra note 26, at 5.  More specifically, they use “the value of credit 
by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP” as a measure of fi-
nancial deepening.  Id. at 10. 
 37 As noted above, financial deepening leads to growth by intermediating domes-
tic savings and productive investment.  See supra Part II.A.  If individuals use all or 
most of their disposable income to fund consumption, whether through cash or fi-
nanced purchases, the domestic savings rate may drop, leaving less capital available 
for productive investment.  Similarly, if savings are intermediated to finance house-
hold consumption, those resources may not expand the productive capacity of an 
economy to their fullest potential. 
 38 See Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Address at An-
nual Bankers’ Conference 3–4 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
review/r061121e.pdf (noting that the literature on law, finance and development 
emphasizes corporate finance but applying the insights to consumer finance). 
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Setting aside concerns about reduced domestic saving and in-
creasing inflation, there are many ways that lending to individuals 
and households can plausibly promote growth and development.  
And there is evidence that policymakers in some developing coun-
tries have adopted policies specifically designed to expand consumer 
borrowing for that purpose.39  If one measures development in terms 
of consumption of basic goods and services like food, education, 
healthcare, and transportation, then increasing the availability of 
consumer credit can promote such development directly.40  Without 
credit, a consumer would need to save the amount necessary to pur-
chase goods or services before doing so.  Some people may purchase 
goods and services with available credit that they would not purchase 
with savings because, for example, they may not have the discipline to 
save enough to do so.  Obtaining credit may help some individuals 
commit themselves to applying future income to making such pur-
chases. 
Perhaps more importantly, the availability of consumer finance 
may promote consumption of basic goods and services by enabling 
consumers to smooth their consumption across periods of varying in-
come.  The availability of credit enables borrowers to consume goods 
and services based on their expected wealth or income rather than 
available income or assets.  If an individual experiences a temporary 
drop in income or liquidity, he or she can borrow to maintain a level 
of consumption that is justified by expected income.41  Furthermore, 
such smoothing can enable individuals and households to avoid fi-
nancial collapse in the wake of an income or expense shock and to 
thus avoid incurring greater individual and social costs.42
 39 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 40 For a discussion of the concept of development, see supra notes 32–34. 
 41 See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, A Simple Test of Consumption, 99 J. POL. ECON. 957, 
973–74 (1991); Jonathan Morduch, Between the Market and the State: Can Informal In-
surance Patch the Safety Net?, 14 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 187, 200, 202 (1999); Jonathan 
Morduch, Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 104 
(1995); Paul Gertler et al., Do Microfinance Programs Help Families Insure Con-
sumption Against Illness? 3 (2003) (unpublished article, on file with University of 
California, Berkeley) (noting that “[m]ak[ing] savings more convenient and im-
prov[ing] access to credit” are ways to enable families to self-insure against illness); 
see also Anjini Kochar, Explaining Household Vulnerability to Idiosyncratic Income Shocks, 
85 AM. ECON. REV. 159, 163–64 (1995); Robert M. Townsend, Consumption Insurance: 
An Evaluation of Risk-bearing Systems in Low-income Economies, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 83–
84 (1995); Robert M. Townsend, Risk and Insurance in Village India, 62 ECONOMETRICA 
539, 540–41 (1994). 
 42 If individuals are unable to avoid financial collapse, they may become more 
likely to draw upon social assistance, thereby imposing direct social costs.  See, e.g., 
Barr, supra note 35, at 273 & n.17 (2004). 
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Similarly, at least some household consumption may be more 
appropriately considered investment.43  Consider purchases of dura-
ble goods.  Such goods effectively become assets of the individual or 
household purchaser that may yield significant returns.  Purchasing a 
vehicle, for example, may reduce overall transportation costs.  As as-
sets, durable goods may be used as collateral to acquire additional 
capital, which may in turn be put to productive use.  Consumers may 
eventually use goods such as vehicles, computers, and other small ap-
pliances for both commercial and personal activities.  Durable goods 
may also serve a consumption-smoothing function by providing assets 
that households can borrow against when it might otherwise be diffi-
cult for them to obtain credit.  Furthermore, consumption of many 
non-durable goods and services—especially healthcare and educa-
tion—are effectively investments in human capital.  Such investment 
can increase the productive capacity of individuals and help them ac-
quire skills that make them effective entrepreneurs and innovators. 
Consumer credit may also be used to finance informal or nas-
cent profit-making ventures.  There is evidence that individuals in 
both developed and developing countries fund profit-seeking activi-
ties by borrowing in their capacity as consumers, perhaps because 
creditors would not extend credit against the potential success or 
failure of these profit-seeking activities. 44  While this is functionally a 
form of commercial finance, it is made possible by the expansion of 
consumer financial markets.  Similarly, as noted above, some con-
sumer goods can serve both personal and profit-making functions.  
Finally, under some circumstances, individual and household con-
sumption may also expand final demand for domestic durable and 
non-durable goods and services.  In that case, the availability of con-
sumer finance may support a virtuous cycle of economic growth.45
 43 1 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 387 (Hollis Chenery & T.N. Sriniva-
san eds., 1988). 
 44 See, e.g., Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entre-
preneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543, 544–44 (2003) (“The fact that 20 percent of 
personal bankruptcy filings list business debts suggests how important personal 
bankruptcy procedures are for entrepreneurs.”).  Drawing an example from India, 
approximately twenty-five percent of debt incurred by urban households in that 
country and fifty-three percent of debt incurred by rural households is used for a 
business purpose.  ALL INDIA DEBT AND INV. SURV., REP. NO. 501, 59TH ROUND, NSSO, 
HOUSEHOLD INDEBTEDNESS IN INDIA AS ON 30.06.2002, at 39 (2005). 
 45 See, e.g., Dean M. Maki, The Growth of Consumer Credit and the Household Debt Ser-
vice Burden, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 43 (Thomas A. 
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (“Consumer spending accounts for over two-
thirds of the U.S. gross domestic product, and has been a key driver of the strong 
economic growth of the country has experienced since the early 1990s . . . .”); FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., EVALUATING THE CONSUMER LENDING REVOLUTION (2003) [here-
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The experience of the burgeoning global microfinance industry 
provides at least some evidence that expanding access to consumer 
finance can promote development.46  Microfinance institutions gen-
erally lend very small amounts of money to individuals and groups to 
fund microenterprises.47  Because this industry is still a relatively small 
part of any particular economy, it is questionable whether microfi-
nance now significantly affects broad measures of financial deepen-
ing.48  Furthermore, as one writer notes, “[t]here are few reliable es-
timates of the net impacts of [microfinance] programs.”49  There is 
some evidence, however, that expanding microfinance can benefit 
individuals and households along important categories of human de-
velopment by increasing their consumption of basic goods and ser-
vices.50  It is important to note that evidence drawn from the experi-
inafter CONSUMER LENDING], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/ 
fyi/2003/091703fyi.html (describing how consumption plays a significant role in 
promoting growth of the American economy); see also JONATHAN ABLETT ET AL., 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE “BIRD OF GOLD”: THE RISE OF INDIA’S CONSUMER MARKET 
93–102 (2007) (proposing that consumption in India has the potential to spur 
growth in that country).  Maki notes that there has been relatively little research on 
the role of consumer credit in the economy.  Maki, supra, at 45.  In fact, it appears 
that at least some developing countries have adopted policies in recent years to en-
courage consumer borrowing to support overall growth in their economies.  See infra 
note 134 and accompanying text. 
 46 Barr, supra note 35, at 273; Karlan & Zinman, supra note 13, at 2 (“Expanding 
access to credit is a key ingredient of development strategies worldwide.”).  The 
United Nations designated 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit.  Id.  Mu-
hammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh was awarded the No-
bel Peace Prize along with Grameen Bank in 2006.  Press Release, The Norwegian 
Nobel Committee, Nobel Peace Prize 2006 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http:// 
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.  For a compelling 
critique of the enthusiasm for Grameen Bank’s lending model, see  generally Rashmi 
Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has Misperceived the Grameen 
Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217 (2005). 
 47 See Jonathan Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1569, 1569–71 
(1999); Karlan & Zinman, supra note 13, at 3 (2006).  Thus, most studies of the effect 
of microborrowing focus on microentreprenurial borrowing, not consumption.  Id.   
 48 Morduch claims that expanding finance to the not-so-poor may “foster eco-
nomic efficiency and perhaps economic growth.”  Morduch, supra note 47, at 1572; 
see also Valerie Bencivenga & Bruce D. Smith, Financial Intermediation and Endogenous 
Growth, 58 REV. ECON. STUDS. 195, 203–04 (1991). 
 49 Morduch, supra note 47, at 1598. 
 50 There is evidence, for example, that improving access to credit for low-income 
individuals and households appears to increase their consumption of basic goods 
and services.  See Karlan & Zinman, supra note 13, at  2–4; Morduch, supra note 47, at 
1593; see also SHAHIDUR KHANDKER, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH MICROCREDIT: EXPERIENCE 
IN BANGLADESH 145–46 (1998); Signe-Mary McKernan, The Impact of Microcredit Pro-
grams on Self-Employment Profits: Do Non-Credit Program Aspects Matter?, 84 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 93 (2002); Mark Pitt & Shahidur Khandker, The Impacts of Group-Based Credit 
Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?, 106 J. 
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ence of microlending is only imperfectly probative of the effects of 
expanding access to conventional consumer financial markets.  Mi-
crofinance is generally extended for the purpose of reducing poverty 
by helping poor individuals begin to earn income.  It is arguably dis-
tinguishable from conventional, formal consumer credit.51  It is not 
generally extended to individuals who already have appreciable dis-
posable income, and it is not generally extended to finance purchases 
of relatively expensive goods or services like automobiles, healthcare, 
or education.  Recently, however, Karlan and Zinman have shown 
that access to slightly larger amounts of conventional consumer credit 
can promote individual and household consumption of goods and 
services that are associated with human development.52  In that study, 
a South African lender relaxed lending standards to extend loans to 
some borrowers who would not have received credit under normal 
measures of creditworthiness.  The researchers found that those bor-
rowers were more likely to remain employed, less likely to experience 
hunger, and less likely to become impoverished than similar appli-
cants who were refused consumer loans.53
Finally, expanding the availability of consumer finance may also 
promote development more indirectly by helping to support impor-
tant social and cultural institutions.  A consumer who is drawn into 
formal financial markets may become more invested in the continued 
stability of his or her society, perhaps because his or her ability to sat-
isfy debt obligations depends in part on the general success of the 
broader economy.  Furthermore, as individuals and households are 
able to consume “discretionary” goods like healthcare and education, 
and are thereby able to develop their own capacities, they may be-
come more affirmatively committed to broader institutional and eco-
nomic development.  In many developing countries, political support 
for development policies is essential yet contingent and often fleet-
ing.54  Individuals may be more likely to support such policies if they 
POL. ECON. 958 (1998); Nidhiya Menon, Consumption Smoothing in Microcredit 
Programs 1 (Aug. 2003) (unpublished article, on file with Deptartment of Econom-
ics, University of Connecticut).  Not all microfinance improves consumption, how-
ever.  See Morduch, supra note 47, at 1594.  It is interesting that there is evidence that 
wealthier families benefit more from microfinance than do poorer families.  See id. at 
1599–1601.  This may provide additional support for the claim that consumer lend-
ing can support growth and development as per capita incomes rise in an economy. 
 51 Admittedly, the distinctions between these types of financial relationships are 
blurry.  These distinctions are drawn here only to acknowledge that evidence of the 
effects of microfinance may not directly support the claims of this Article. 
 52 See generally Karlan & Zinman, supra note 13. 
 53 Id. at 5. 
 54 See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text. 
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experience direct benefits of broader growth and development.  The 
capacity of credit to enable individuals to smooth consumption in the 
wake of economic distress or dislocation may have especially impor-
tant political consequences. 
C. Costs of Consumer Lending 
If consumer credit can, in theory, help fuel economic growth or 
development, it can also generate significant costs and negative ex-
ternalities.  Some of these relate to macroeconomic effects of ex-
panding consumption.  Such consumption may lead to destructive in-
flation.55  As noted above, it may also lead to erosion of the domestic 
savings rate.56  Other potential risks and costs stem from consumers’ 
financial distress or over-indebtedness.57  Consumers may become 
over-indebted because they are overly optimistic, uninformed, or un-
disciplined; any of these qualities can cause an individual to borrow 
too much in relation to their actual and/or expected incomes.  
Available data from the United States suggest, however, that most 
consumers in this country are likely to become insolvent or experi-
ence financial distress because they experience unexpected exoge-
nous shocks, such as involuntary unemployment or sickness.58
 55 An increasing demand for goods and services, for example, tends to create an 
upward pressure on prices, and high inflation can erode the benefits of rising in-
comes.  In general, taming inflation is the job of central bankers who control mone-
tary policy and have the ability to increase credit constraints to dampen inflationary 
effects. 
 56 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 57 While over-indebtedness is difficult to define, it is a much broader category 
than formal insolvency.  As the term is used here, it includes not only insolvency and 
financial distress, but a high ratio of debt-to-income (and debt-to-assets) as well.  
Readers will inevitably disagree about what debt-to-asset/income ratio, if any, consti-
tutes “over-indebtedness” in any particular context.  This Article does not aim to de-
fine the concept of over-indebtedness, but it does assume that over-indebtedness can 
occur well before an individual or household becomes insolvent. 
 58 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLECLASS: AMERICANS IN 
DEBT (2000); Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An 
Alternate Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 552–55 
(2006); Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates 
over Health Care Financing: Evidence From the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
375(2001); David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE), Feb. 2, 2005, at W5-63, available at http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63v1.pdf; see also David Dranove & Michael 
L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 28, 2006, at W74 
(challenging some of the conclusions of Himmelstein et al.).  It is certainly possible 
that many consumers and households become over-indebted for behavioral reasons 
and then suffer an external shock that pushes them over the edge into insolvency.  
We simply do not know as much about the determinants of over-indebtedness as we 
do about the determinants of bankruptcy or insolvency.  In any event, the determi-
FEIBELMAN (FINAL) 1/26/2009  12:10:19 PM 
80 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:63 
 
As indebted consumers have trouble repaying obligations, they 
inevitably incur additional costs in the form of late fees and penalties, 
or additional charges for renewals, rollovers, and forbearances.59  
These additional costs reduce the amount of money consumers have 
to spend on other goods and services, which may have negative ef-
fects on their own welfare and on broader economic growth.60  This 
may result in a misallocation of financial resources.  But over-
indebtedness can create additional costs, especially when it deepens 
financial distress or hastens insolvency.  Over-indebted individuals 
may become less productive, perhaps thereby creating negative ex-
ternalities, if their indebtedness reduces their incentives to earn in-
come.  Because they must use a large portion of wage income to re-
pay creditors, they may not get much personal benefit from their 
labors.  Consumer over-indebtedness may impose additional costs on 
society if individuals’ indebtedness causes them to seek publicly 
funded social assistance.  Over-indebted individuals may also under-
consume necessary goods (like food) or “discretionary” goods (like 
education or health care), which can impose longer-term costs on so-
ciety.  If individuals try to work their way out of insolvency or over-
indebtedness, they may subject themselves to physical harms and de-
graded health—they may also stress basic social and cultural institu-
tions, especially familial relationships. 61  Psychological dimensions of 
financial distress may increase these effects.62  Finally, as recent prob-
nants of over-indebtedness likely vary across countries; it is possible that exogenous 
shocks are more or less of a determinant of financial distress in developing countries 
than they are in the United States or vice versa. 
 59 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374, 1393 (2004); 
Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 375, 384–92 (2007); Feibelman, supra note 16, at 166 (discussing the costs of 
financial collapse). 
 60 See, e.g., CONSUMER LENDING, supra note 45 (“The unusual pattern of consumer 
spending and borrowing during and after the recent recession has led some experts 
to worry that consumers are overburdened.  Under some of the more pessimistic 
scenarios, future economic growth could be stifled as consumers are forced to curtail 
spending to service debt.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh 
Start or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1077–78 (2004) (noting the emo-
tional and social costs of debtors with high debt burdens); Hallinan, supra note 16, at 
130; Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 453, 476–77 (2004) (discussing the connection between financial dis-
tress, emotional stress, and health problems); see also John C. Akard, The Human Side 
of Bankruptcy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (1999). 
 62 See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 187, 194 (1998); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting 
Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 484 (2006); Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & 
Jay L. Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Ex-
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lems stemming from the experience of subprime mortgage financing 
in the United States illustrate, widespread over-indebtedness can 
sometimes cause broader disruptions for financial firms and capital 
markets.  Unfortunately, data on these various costs are very limited.  
It is increasingly important to have such information, however, as 
there is growing evidence of increasing levels of over-indebtedness in 
developing countries with nascent consumer financial markets.63
III. LAW AND CONSUMER FINANCE 
A. Law, Finance, and Development 
This Part examines whether legal reforms can promote the ben-
efits and reduce the risks and costs of expanding consumer finance.  
A large and important body of research examines the role that legal 
rules, regimes, and institutions play in providing important condi-
tions for financial deepening, growth, and development.64  This body 
of research is part of a much larger body of literature on the role of 
law in promoting social and economic development.65  This intellec-
traordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2006); Scott Fay et 
al., The Bankruptcy Decision: Does Stigma Matter? 2 (University of Michigan Departmentt 
of Economics, Working Paper No. 98-01, 1998). 
 63 Default rates appear to have been increasing in many of these countries.  It al-
so appears that consumers in these countries are increasingly seeking relief from 
their obligations or protection from their creditors.  There are growing indications 
of frequent aggressive debt collection activities by creditors in these countries.  See in-
fra note 142. 
 64 For good and recent discussions of much of this literature, see KENNETH W. 
DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(2006) and Ohnesorge, supra note 12, at 243–52.  Some of this work focuses on the 
quality of basic legal institutions, such as the ability of judicial systems to protect 
property rights or to enforce contractual obligations.  See, e.g., DEEPAK LAL, THE 
POVERTY OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (1983); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH & 
ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 
(1973); Douglass C. North & Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolu-
tion of Institutions of Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 
824 (1989); Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and 
How to Acquire Them (Oct. 1999) (unnumbered working paper), available at 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/institutions.pdf. 
 65 See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY POLITICS, 
THEORY (2004). This intellectual tradition includes the work of writers such as Max 
Weber, Friedrich Hayek, and John Locke, among countless others.  See F.A. HAYEK, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: 
RULES AND ORDER (1973); 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE 
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976); 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE 
POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979); MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 
(1954); see also Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the 
Economic Impact of Property Rights 5 (University of New England School of Law, Work-
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tual tradition is broadly associated with a series of law and develop-
ment movements that have helped foster large- and small-scale devel-
opment and reform projects across the globe since the 1950s.66  Im-
proving domestic legal systems continues to be a centerpiece of the 
World Bank’s activities to promote development and to improve liv-
ing conditions around the globe.67
Modern economic theories of development emphasize this con-
nection between law reform and development, ascribing a crucial 
role to human institutions in general and to legal institutions in par-
ticular.68  In this context, legal institutions most notably include 
courts and other administrative bodies, judges, lawyers, and legal 
rules and regimes.  But they also include a broader spectrum of 
guides and constraints—formal and informal—that help structure 
human interaction.69  According to this literature, the primary ways 
that legal institutions promote economic development is by securing 
and stabilizing property rights70 and by providing for the enforce-
ing Paper No. 15-2007) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 124 
(1690)). 
 66 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also DAVID M. TRUBECK & ALVARO 
SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006); 
Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 163–64 (2003); 
Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries Through the New Law and 
Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing Re-
sults, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 385–89 (2002); David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars 
in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflection on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the 
U.S., 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1065–69; Dyal-Chand, supra note 65, at 4 n.19. 
 67 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 68 Writers contributing to this body of work have explored various human institu-
tions that affect development.  E.g., CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN 
PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000); WEBER, supra 
note 65; MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958); 
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 
(1995); see also Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, & James Robinson, Reversal of For-
tune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 
Q.J. ECON 1231 (2002); Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 
106 Q.J. ECON. 407 (1991); Gerald W. Scully, The Institutional Framework and Economic 
Development, 96 J. POL. ECON. 652 (1988); Rodrik, supra note 64 (describing institu-
tions that are important for growth, including social insurance regimes). 
 69 See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Prize Lecture, pt II (Dec. 9, 1993), in ECONOMIC 
SCIENCES: 1991–1995 (NOBEL LECTURES) 112 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997). 
 70 See, e.g., DAM, supra note 64, at 129–33; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF 
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 182–88 
(2000); RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 129–157 (discussing the importance of 
property rights in history); TAMANAHA, supra note 65, at 119–21 (2004); Gordon C. 
Rausser, Lessons for Emerging Market Economies in Eastern Europe, in THE EMERGENCE OF 
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 311, 311–332 (Christopher C. Clauge & 
Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992); WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 48–49 (1996); Cheryl W. Gray, Legal Process and Economic 
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ment of contractual obligations.71  Because most financial relation-
ships are contractual in nature, enforcement of contractual obliga-
tions is particularly important for the growth of financial markets.72  
While there is growing consensus that these basic legal institutions 
can promote financial deepening and economic development, it has 
been surprisingly hard to prove.  A number of recent studies have 
shown that judicial quality is correlated with financial deepening,73 
and a smaller number of studies appear to show a causal effect of ju-
dicial enforcement on credit markets.74
An important and influential body of literature on law and fi-
nance looks beyond the basic legal institutions described above and 
also explores how particular legal protections for corporate investors 
Development: A Case Study of Indonesia, 19 WORLD DEV. 763 (1991); Richard A. Posner, 
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RESEARCH 
OBSERVER 1 (1999); see also Dyal-Chand, supra note 65, (critiquing this tradition).  
The stability of property rights, it is argued, improves the ability of economic actors 
to control an asset and direct or retain returns on the asset.  Rodrik, supra note 64, at 
5.  This in turn helps motivate actors to acquire economic assets in the first place, to 
develop those assets, and to improve the processes by which they develop such assets.  
Id.  It also enables individuals to use their assets as capital—to allocate rights or in-
terests in the asset in return for financing.  See DE SOTO, supra, at 6; RAJAN & ZINGALES, 
supra note 25, at 32–33. 
 71 See, e.g., DAM, supra note 64, at 123–29; Posner, supra note 70, at 3–8; see also 
Mathieu Chemin, Does Judicial Quality Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Judicial 
Reform in India 6 (Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques 
et l’Emploi, Working Paper No. 07-25, 2007).  For a classic description of the eco-
nomic role of contract, see MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1–11 (4th ed. 2001). 
 72 See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 7–8, 27.  In theory, if enforcement of 
obligations is uncertain or slow, then borrowers may act opportunistically and refuse 
to repay or to renegotiate with their creditors. This will presumably increase the cost 
of capital.  See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 
133–37 (1989); see also Chemin, supra note 71, at 3–4, 23 (discussing the economic li-
terature on this point). 
 73 See, e.g., Marcela Crisitini et al., The Importance of an Effective Legal System for Cre-
dit Markets: The Case of Argentina, in DEFUSING DEFAULT: INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS 
119, 155–56  (Marco Pagano ed., 2001); Armando Castelar Pinheiro & Celia Cabral, 
Credit Markets in Brazil: The Role of Judicial Enforcement and Other Institutions, in 
DEFUSING DEFAULT: INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS, supra, at 157; Tullio Japelli et al., 
Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 223 (2005).  As is true with the correlation of financial deepening and 
growth, however, it is hard to establish that the existence of basic legal institutions 
causes financial deepening and that these factors are not endogenous.  See Chemin, 
supra note 71, at 2–3. 
 74 See, e.g., Matthieu Chemin, Decoding the Code of Civil Procedure: Do Judiciaries Mat-
ter for Growth? 2, 28–35, 43–53 (Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques 
Économiques et l’Emploi, Working Paper No. 07-26, 2007); Chemin, supra note 71, 
at 5.   
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and lenders appear to promote economic growth.75  Some of these 
protections are related to equity investments in firms, including 
shareholder rights, especially shareholder voting mechanisms.76  Oth-
ers relate to lending relationships, including creditors’ rights against 
defaulting and insolvent firms,77 especially corporate bankruptcy 
laws.78  A number of studies in this literature indicate that corporate 
bankruptcy law is correlated with economic growth, and these find-
 75 E.g., Raphael LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) 
[hereinafter LaPorta et al., Law and Finance]; Raphael LaPorta et al., Legal Determi-
nants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter LaPorta et al., Legal De-
terminants].  For helpful discussions of this literature, see DAM, supra note 64, at 31–
35, 204–08; Ohnesorge, supra note 12, at 252–55; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25, at 
576; James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 
117 YALE L.J. 340, 351 (2007); Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Fi-
nancial Development 18 (World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper 
No. 3136, 2003) (reviewing the law and finance literature).  For recent works in the 
law and finance literature, see, for example, Stijn Claessens & Leora F. Klapper, 
Bankruptcy Around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use, 7 AM. L. ECON. REV. 253 
(2005); Simeon Djankov et al., Debt Enforcement Around the World (European Corpo-
rate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 147/2007, 2007). 
 76 E.g., LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 75, at 1133–37. 
 77 Id.  In one study, LaPorta and his coauthors measure protection of creditors as 
a function of (1) whether secured lenders are subject to an automatic stay in bank-
ruptcy proceedings; (2) whether secured lenders can get their collateral in the event 
of a reorganization of their debtor; (3) whether debtors can file for bankruptcy with-
out creditors’ consent; and (4) whether management of a debtor can retain control 
of the debtor during reorganization.  LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 75, at 
1135.  The authors find  that such protections are correlated to growth.  Id. at 1135–
40. 
 78 See generally LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 75.  These authors 
have been criticized for this emphasis on bankruptcy law.  See, e.g., DAM, supra note 
64.  As discussed infra notes 94 through 97 and accompanying text, there is much 
variation in bankruptcy laws around the globe.  There are some basic components of 
these regimes, however, that arguably define the category.  Most fundamentally, 
bankruptcy regimes provide a mechanism by which an insolvent debtor, or one ex-
periencing some form of financial distress, can stay the collection efforts of its credi-
tors and seek an orderly resolution or restructuring of its obligations.  In the context 
of corporate debtors, a primary function of bankruptcy law is to provide a procedural 
mechanism for choosing between liquidation and restructuring of insolvent corpo-
rate debtors. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 
107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1807–08 (1998).  This can increase creditors’ insolvency-state re-
turn by avoiding inefficient liquidation where a debtor has a relatively high going-
concern value.  In the absence of a bankruptcy mechanism, creditors could easily 
face a collective-action problem and race to collect from a struggling debtor, effec-
tively liquidating it.  See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 7–19 (1986).  Bankruptcy law can also provide a timely resolution of 
claims and disputes to reduce the erstwhile wasting of assets.  Ideally, these factors 
provide an ex ante benefit to borrowers by reducing the cost of credit. 
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ings have helped establish a growing consensus that corporate bank-
ruptcy law can help support a robust financial market.79
Some of the early and most notable work in the law and finance 
literature asserted that, as a general matter, a country’s legal origins 
affected its level of investor and lender protections.  In particular, this 
work found that legal systems derived from common law roots are 
more likely to have strong investor and lender protections, which are 
generally correlated with higher levels of economic growth.80  This 
aspect of the law and finance literature has been very controversial.81  
 79 Corporate bankruptcy law is now widely believed to be particularly important 
for countries making a transition away from a planned economy.  See, e.g., JAMSHED J. 
IRANI, EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW, REPORT ON COMPANY LAW 67 (2005); Al-
exander Biryukov, Ukrainian Bankruptcy Law in the Context of Regional and International 
Developments, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 15 (2007); Charles Booth, Drafting 
Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments in China and Vietnam, 
18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 94 (2004).  The International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank’s joint Financial Sector Assessment Program include corporate bank-
ruptcy/insolvency law as an important component of an effective legal infrastructure 
for financial systems.  See Assessing the Legal Infrastructure of Financial Systems, Fi-
nancial Sector Assessment Handbook, 223–38 (2005), available at http://www.imf.org 
/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/ch09.pdf (“Effective creditor rights and insolvency 
systems play a vital role in helping to sustain financial soundness, and they promote 
commercial confidence by enabling market participants and stakeholders to more 
accurately price, manage, and resolve the risks of default and nonperformance.”).  
The Uniform Commission on International Trade Law has also published a legisla-
tive guide on bankruptcy/insolvency law to assist countries in “the establishment of 
an efficient and effective legal framework to address the financial difficulty of debt-
ors.”  See 2004—UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law, http://www.unc 
itral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html (last visited Dec. 
28, 2008). 
 80 See generally, LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 75. 
 81 Several authors have criticized the basic law and finance literature, especially 
the significance of legal origins. See DAM, supra note 64, at 213–14; Beth Ahlering & 
Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case of Insti-
tutional Complimentarity?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 865 (2007) (criticizing the legal origins 
claim); Douglas W. Arner et al., Property Rights, Collateral, Creditor Rights, and Insolvency 
in East Asia, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 515, 521–22 (2007); Daniel Berkowitz et al., supra note 
66, at 167 (criticizing the legal origins claim); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance and Path 
Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1669–94 (2002); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
229 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: An-
choring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (2007) (suggesting that the law 
and finance account of the prevalence of controlling shareholders is incomplete); 
Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 
464 (2006) (arguing that legal origins are an incomplete explanation for variations 
in financial regulation).  As two scholars have recently noted, “the classification of 
legal origins is really no more than a proxy for underlying differences.  In order to 
avoid the problems of classification, therefore, it would be better to seek to code 
these differences directly.”  John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The 
Case of India 5 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 
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Less controversial, however, is the proposition that certain types of 
legal rules and regimes—protections for investors and lenders in par-
ticular—are related to economic growth.82  Even this claim is still sub-
ject to debate.  As many writers have noted, basic enforcement me-
chanisms may matter more than the substance of laws and 
regulations.83  Furthermore, it is not clear what significance the law 
and finance literature may have for developing economies.84  These 
countries cannot change their legal origins.  And, as noted above, it 
may be difficult for countries to adopt and employ such laws and 
regulations if they do not already have them.85
B. Legal Institutions and Consumer Finance 
To the extent that consumer finance can promote growth and 
development, expanding this market should be a concern of devel-
opment policy.  And if legal institutions generally promote financial 
deepening, it stands to reason that such institutions have the poten-
tial to help unleash the productive capacity of consumer financial 
markets.  As an initial matter, many of the legal institutions that are 
believed to promote financial deepening and growth in general—
especially stable property rights and predictable enforcement of con-
tractual obligations—presumably support the expansion of consumer 
lending in particular.  If a creditor is likely to be able to enforce an 
individual’s promise to repay, the creditor should be more likely to 
extend credit in the first place and to charge less for doing so.  As the 
price for credit drops, more consumers should be able to borrow.  
107/2008, 2008).  In their study of India, these writers emphasize the “link between 
economic and financial structure.”  Id. at 7. 
 82 E.g., DAM, supra note 64, at 159–60 (noting that even critics of the law and fi-
nance literature agree that legal institutions can promote financial deepening); Ar-
mour & Lele, supra note 81, at 1 (noting the two related claims of the law and fi-
nance literature—law matters and origins matter). 
 83 See Howell Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary 
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 275 (2007) (arguing that en-
forcement matters more than the substance legal regulation); DAM, supra note 64, at 
207 (“[E]nforcement may be more important than substantive law in protecting 
shareholders and creditors.”). 
 84 DAM, supra note 64, at 226.  The law and finance literature “has few direct pol-
icy implications for developing countries.”  Id. at 225.  Dam observes that, for devel-
oping economies, protections for creditors—especially basic enforcement of con-
tracts including regulation of secured lending and bankruptcy law—are more 
important than investor protections.  Id. at 230.  Dam also notes that low-income 
countries often have strong investor and lender protections.  Id. at 207–08. 
 85 See id. at 215–16.  ”[T]he less developed an economy the more important in 
the improvement in secured transaction law, as opposed to bankruptcy law . . . .”  Id. 
at 217. 
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This reinforces the conventional understanding that improving gen-
eral administration of justice is one of the most important goals that 
developing countries can pursue. 
Beyond improving these basic legal institutions, however, other 
legal institutions or regulations may also directly or indirectly pro-
mote consumer lending.  For example, banking laws and regulations 
can be designed or reformed to increase the ability or motivation of 
banks to lend to consumers.  Policymakers might eliminate or relax 
regulations that direct banks’ lending policies away from consumer 
finance, expand branching opportunities for banks, reduce barriers 
to entering financial services industries, liberalize foreign access to 
domestic retail banking sectors, and/or re-examine rate regulations.  
They might also adopt or improve credit-reporting institutions and 
credit-scoring systems.86  And, as discussed below, legal institutions 
may help expand consumer lending by increasing demand for credit 
and lessening social or cultural resistance to borrowing. 
Even if policymakers in developing countries do not want to take 
affirmative steps to expand consumer financial markets, rates of con-
sumer lending in many of these countries will likely continue to in-
crease, perhaps dramatically.  Thus, in any event, it will probably be 
important for them to take steps to reduce the potential costs of con-
sumer finance.  The potential consequences of regulatory inaction in 
this area may be significant.  Over-indebtedness and other costs of 
consumer borrowing have the potential to be disruptive forces in an 
economy, especially in a vulnerable, developing economy. Develop-
ing countries that have not already addressed the potential costs of 
growing consumer indebtedness may be forced by circumstance to do 
so.  To date, the development community, including the World Bank, 
has been slow to emphasize the importance of attending to the prom-
ises and perils of increasing consumer lending.87
 86 See, e.g., Fair Credit Report Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 2006).  “The banking 
system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit re-
ports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting 
methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued func-
tioning of the banking system.”  Id. at § 1681(a)(1).  “Consumer reporting agencies 
have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other in-
formation on consumers.”  Id. at § 1681(a)(3).  For a nice discussion of the value of 
credit reporting in consumer financial markets, see Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping 
in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing, 4 ECON. & POL. 117 (1992). 
 87 It appears that the World Bank has recently begun to focus more on issues re-
lated to regulation of consumer lending.  Last year, for example, the Bank partici-
pated in “pilot assessments” of “consumer protection in financial services.”  See 
WorldBank.org, Private Sector Development—Consumer Protection and Financial 
Literacy, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT 
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There are a variety of common policies, rules, and legal regimes 
that contemporary societies employ to moderate the risks and costs of 
consumer lending and, ideally, to reduce over-indebtedness.  These 
include disclosure requirements,88 financial education,89 ex ante sub-
stantive regulation (especially rate regulation),90 and ex-post debt re-
/EXTECAREGTOPPRVSECDEV/0,,contentMDK:21361393~pagePK:34004173~piPK
:34003707~theSitePK:570955,00.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2008).  This year, the Bank 
sponsored the Global Seminar on Financial Literacy and Consumer Protection.  Id.   
 88 In theory, disclosure of the terms of proposed credit transactions should also 
promote financial markets. See, e.g., Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. 491, 513 (1981); Hynes & Posner, supra note 
15, at 193–95; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
Some writers argue that the market itself will often or usually require sufficient dis-
closure.  See generally Schwartz & Wilde, supra.  Nonetheless, mandatory disclosure is a 
ubiquitous regulatory approach to consumer commercial transactions.  E.g., Thomas 
A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Protection, in THE IMPACT OF 
PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 110 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten 
eds., 2001) (“[M]andatory disclosure has become the main financial consumer-
protection approach in the United States at the federal government level.”).  There 
are reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness of such requirements.  Matthew A. 
Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socioeconomics and 
Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 199, 219–34 (2005) (discussing 
mandatory disclosure in general and the Truth in Lending Act in particular); Hynes 
& Posner, supra note 15, at 194–95 (discussing criticism of the Truth in Lending Act 
in particular); Kathleen E. Keest, Whither Now? Truth in Lending in Transition—Again, 
49 CONSUMER. FIN. L. Q. REP. 360, 360 (1995); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Under-
standing, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending 
Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 814–15 (2003); Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some 
Lessons from the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 234–35 (1991).  It is worth not-
ing that written disclosures face additional limitations where a significant number of 
potential consumers cannot read, a circumstance that obtains in many emerging 
economies. 
 89 If successful, financial education can enable consumers to learn how to man-
age consumption through budgeting, accounting, and employing credit and other 
financial services, it can also help individuals appreciate the benefit of substantive le-
gal protections, including debt relief, which may in turn reduce the stigmas associ-
ated with debt and financial distress.  Many commentators are skeptical, however, of 
the likely success of financial education programs.  See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, 
Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit Focused Debtor Education May Not 
Work, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 947–48 (1999); Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Emp-
ty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-petition Credit Counseling and Post-petition 
Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549, 549–53 (2005); Ka-
ren Gross, Financial Literacy Education: Panacea, Palliative, or Something Worse?, 24 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 309 (2005). 
 90 Rate regulation has the potential to reduce over-indebtedness by limiting the 
immediate cost of credit, though creditors can often find ways to effectively avoid 
rate regulation, especially by charging higher costs and fees that are not included in 
calculating rates.  Even if rate regulation effectively limits the amount that creditors 
can charge for lending, it is a relatively blunt tool.  If successful, it inevitably limits 
access to credit according to credit-worthiness, but imperfectly so.  Such regulation 
can make it unprofitable to lend to borrowers who have a certain level of risk, even if 
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lief, including restructuring obligations, regulating debt-collectors, 
and exempting some assets from the reach of creditors.91  While each 
of these policies certainly has its limitations, it is likely that some 
combination of them could help reduce the risks and costs of deep-
ening consumer financial markets in developing economies.  It is also 
worth noting that most of these, especially education and disclosure, 
may help expand efficient lending as well as reduce its attendant risks 
and costs.  Thus, in theory, there is an optimal combination of such 
legal regimes or institutions that would best support a consumer fi-
nancial market in a developed or developing economy.  This Article 
does not aim to describe such an optimal framework.  Rather, it ex-
plores one particular legal regime—consumer bankruptcy—to elabo-
rate the broader point that legal institutions have the potential to 
contribute to growth and development by promoting efficient con-
sumer lending. 
IV. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
Given the growing consensus that corporate bankruptcy law can 
promote sustainable growth and development, it is at least puzzling 
that consumer bankruptcy is, at most, peripheral to debates over de-
velopment policy.92  This incongruity probably stems from the fact 
that, as argued above, the literature on law, finance, and develop-
ment generally ignores both the promises and the perils of deepen-
ing consumer finance.  That said, it should not be surprising that the 
determinants of corporate finance are more a matter of concern for 
domestic policymakers than the determinants of consumer lending.  
The performance of commercial enterprises is likely to be more im-
portant for economic development than the expansion of consumer 
those individuals could easily borrow and repay.  See, e.g., Karlan & Zinman, supra 
note 13.  It can effectively prohibit transactions that would otherwise benefit particu-
lar borrowers and creditors, lead to credit rationing, and, in some circumstances, 
push borrowers to illegal sources of credit.  See id. 
 91 See infra text accompanying notes 98–104. 
 92 The law and finance literature focuses on aspects of bankruptcy law that relate 
to firms and corporate bankruptcy, such as the role of managers of insolvent firms or 
the effect of reorganizations on secured creditors.  See supra note 78 and accompany-
ing text.  It does not attempt to address whether consumer bankruptcy law also af-
fects economic growth or development.  For example, survey responses to a hypo-
thetical insolvency involving a corporate debtor.  See Djankov et al., supra note 75.  See 
also Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: An Empirical Investigation of 50 Juris-
dictions Worldwide, (unnumbered working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1079724 (analyzing corporate 
bankruptcy regimes).  Rajan and Zingales appear to be among the very few who have 
proposed that consumer bankruptcy law may be an important component of devel-
opment policy.  See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 278–306.  
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finance.  But this alone does not explain the general lack of interest 
in considering the potential role of consumer bankruptcy in devel-
opment policy.  This Part argues that, at least under some circum-
stances, consumer bankruptcy law can provide an especially useful 
tool for promoting productive consumer finance in developing 
economies while reducing the attendant risks and costs of over-
indebtedness.  It also examines possible reasons why policymakers in 
developing countries may be hesitant to adopt or to reform consumer 
bankruptcy regimes. 
A. The Case for Consumer Bankruptcy 
At the broadest level of generality, the functions of consumer 
bankruptcy law are similar to those of corporate bankruptcy.  Both 
are designed to resolve legal and financial issues relating to insolvent 
or over-indebted debtors—especially to protect the interests of credi-
tors as much as possible and to efficiently allocate risks and losses.  In 
the corporate context, this largely involves deciding whether to reor-
ganize or liquidate an insolvent corporate debtor.93  But consumers 
obviously cannot be liquidated.  Consumer bankruptcy is thus gener-
ally a forum for arranging orderly repayment of debtors’ obligations 
and, under most regimes, for restructuring at least some of their ob-
ligations.  Although particular institutional designs vary considerably, 
consumer bankruptcy almost universally serves first to stay collection 
of an individual debtor’s obligations and then to provide for a 
scheme of repayment, to eventually discharge some obligations, and 
to distribute debtor’s available non-exempt assets to creditors. 
Consumer bankruptcy law in the United States is widely recog-
nized as providing comparatively generous opportunities to discharge 
obligations, allowing for relatively speedy discharge in exchange for 
non-exempt assets.94  England and some former British colonies (like 
 93 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 94 See generally Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
81, 82 (2002).  Insolvent individuals in the United States can voluntarily file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, a federal stat-
ute.  Most individuals in the United States file under Chapter 7, which allows a deb-
tor to discharge many unsecured obligations if the debtor gives non-exempt assets to 
his or her unsecured creditors.  Id. at 87.  Debtors can obtain a discharge of debts 
under Chapter 13 if they complete a plan under which they must give their dispos-
able income to unsecured creditors over a period of three to five years.  Id. at 88.  
Until recently, individuals could choose rather freely whether to file under Chapter 7 
or Chapter 13.  After recent reforms to the Bankruptcy Code, some debtors with rela-
tively high-income are precluded from filing under Chapter 7.  For a description of 
the recent reform see, e.g., Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: 
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Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) similarly provide for automatic 
discharge of some consumer debts but not as quickly as in the United 
States and with less generous exemptions.95  A competing model of 
consumer bankruptcy, notably associated with France, allows con-
sumers to discharge obligations at the discretion of administrative 
agents.96  A third model of consumer bankruptcy relief, recently 
adopted by Germany, allows for a discharge of obligations after a 
debtor pays a portion of his or her non-exempt income for a period 
of years.97  As these different models reflect, it is possible to calibrate 
the extent of debt relief available under any particular consumer 
bankruptcy regime through a variety of institutional design choices. 
A consumer bankruptcy regime that provides some meaningful 
degree of debt relief (as all of the aforementioned models potentially 
do) can be an effective tool for reducing the social costs of consumer 
finance.  Staying enforcement of a debtor’s obligations, for example, 
gives the debtor a tool to escape, at least momentarily,98 from their 
creditor’s collection efforts.  Such a stay of enforcement and collec-
tion activities should reduce at least some of the strain of financial 
distress.  This effect may be large if this strain grows more acute as 
collection activities loom larger on the horizon.  The stay also sup-
ports other functions of bankruptcy by providing time and space for 
these functions to be implemented.  Perhaps most important, staying 
a debtor’s creditors can give the debtor time to negotiate with his or 
her creditors.  This may enable the debtor to keep assets that may be 
more valuable to the debtor than to the creditors; doing so might in-
crease creditors’ collective recovery from their common debtor.  It 
can also help reduce the chances that a debtor will experience finan-
cial distress or help reduce the costs of such distress. 
An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 136–37 & n.2 (2007). 
 95 Efrat, supra note 94, at 88–90. Countries including Russia, Taiwan, and the 
Netherlands have adopted a similar approach.  Id. at 89. 
 96 See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, Two Decades, Three Key Questions, and Evolving An-
swers in European Consumer Insolvency Law: Responsibility, Discretion, and Sacri-
fice 8–10 (2008) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1080252 (describing this as the “Romantic” model). 
 97 Id. (describing this as the “Germanic” model).  In Germany, the period of 
payments is now six years.  This model is similar to relief under Chapter 13 in the 
United States.  See Efrat, supra note 94, at 88. 
 98 To be clear, however, a stay would presumably enable secured creditors to en-
force their security without significant delay or have the right to compensation or 
protection for the delay.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
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Allowing debtors to discharge at least some obligations effec-
tively insures them from some of the effects of financial distress.99  
Borrowers presumably pay a premium for this insurance in the form 
of higher interest rates.100  To the extent that the right to discharge is 
mandatory, it forces those who borrow to insure against default in 
this way, making bankruptcy protection a form of social insurance.101  
This social insurance function of consumer bankruptcy can, in the-
ory, reduce a variety of the costs associated with indebtedness.  It may, 
for example, eliminate at least some of the psychological harms and 
costs associated with insolvency and over-indebtedness by reducing a 
debtor’s overall financial obligations.  The potential availability of 
bankruptcy protection may eliminate or reduce some of these costs of 
indebtedness even for individuals who do not actually seek protection 
in bankruptcy.  An individual who simply knows that he or she can 
seek protection in bankruptcy if necessary may experience less emo-
tional strain as a result of their over-indebtedness. 
Bankruptcy protection can stem other, more tangible financial 
costs associated with default and over-indebtedness.  As noted above, 
individuals who are over-indebted are likely to continue to incur vari-
ous costs of financial distress, including fees, penalties, and replace-
ment costs.102  If individuals are able to obtain debt relief in bank-
ruptcy, they should be able to avoid incurring at least some, perhaps 
many, of these costs.  Similarly, debt relief can help insolvent or over-
indebted individuals return to productivity.  This is due in part to the 
fact that individuals obtaining relief will have more motivation to 
earn income because less of that income will go to their creditors.  
Probably more important, however, is the fact that debtors who ob-
tain debt relief will then be able to borrow again for productive pur-
poses.  And finally, debt relief in bankruptcy enables individuals to 
smooth consumption of non-discretionary goods and services as well 
 99 See Feibelman, supra note 16, at 142 & n.25; see also Efrat, supra note 94, at 88. 
 100 The increased cost of credit and potential rationing may also push some high-
risk borrowers to illegal sources or to costly secured lending (or equivalents, like 
pawnbrokers).  As discussed below in more detail, it may also have some offsetting 
beneficial effects in limiting the indebtedness of high-risk borrowers or forcing pri-
vate parties or public institutions to make investments in information gathering and 
evaluation.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 101 See Feibelman, supra note 16, at 142.  This requirement is desirable if purchas-
ing such insurance is generally efficient but would not otherwise take place.  This 
circumstance might occur, for example, if market failures undermine the market for 
such insurance.  See id. at 137 n.25 (noting that markets for potential substitutes for 
debt relief in consumer bankruptcy, such as wage insurance, divorce insurance, and 
credit insurance, are either unavailable or very thin). 
 102 See supra Part III.B. 
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as “discretionary” goods and services like health care and education.  
This should not only reduce the likelihood that individual debtors 
will require social assistance but it should help enable them to de-
velop their basic productive capabilities as well. 
If bankruptcy law can provide private and public benefits ex 
post, there are good reasons to believe that it can also help promote 
nascent consumer financial markets ex ante.  While bankruptcy law 
may appear to be primarily designed to protect insolvent consumers, 
it can provide considerable potential benefits to creditors and credit 
markets.  In fact, consumer bankruptcy and insolvency regimes were 
historically a tool for creditors of insolvent consumer debtors.103  As 
noted above, a well-functioning bankruptcy regime can, in theory, 
improve the ability of creditors to enforce obligations and to collect 
debt from insolvent debtors.104  In the consumer context, bankruptcy 
does this primarily by enforcing security interests and distributing 
non-exempt unsecured assets to unsecured creditors pro rata.  Many 
regimes also require that a debtor repay a portion or all of their dis-
posable income before they can discharge or restructure their obliga-
tions. 
As in the corporate setting, these functions can help solve a col-
lective action problem for creditors.105  Without the coordinating re-
gime, creditors might rush to attach available assets, perhaps forcing 
a debtor into insolvency or reducing the debtor’s ability to earn in-
come.  If they do, they might end up recovering less as a group than 
they would if they hesitated in pursuing their common debtor.  A 
bankruptcy regime can also protect creditors’ interests by enforcing 
other inter-creditor obligations through provisions that unwind pref-
erential or fraudulent transfers.106  If a consumer bankruptcy regime 
can increase the insolvency-state return of creditors, it should in turn 
help expand the availability or reduce the cost of credit to consum-
ers. 
Even if such relief reduces creditors’ insolvency-state returns 
from debtors who experience financial distress, however, it might 
improve their credit-granting decisions ex ante, reducing defaults 
and over-indebtedness in the first place.  Exposing creditors to the 
 103 See generally BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001). 
 104 See JACKSON, supra note 78. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (preferential transfers); 11 
U.S.C. § 548 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (fraudulent transfers). 
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possibility of discharge of obligations owed to them may give credi-
tors additional incentives to gather reliable aggregate and borrower-
specific information bearing on the probability of default.  Lower-risk 
borrowers would in turn have incentives to provide information indi-
cating that their actual risk profile justifies credit.  Higher-risk bor-
rowers would, of course, have to pay higher rates for credit; but this 
theoretically should reduce the amount of credit that these individu-
als can borrow.  This might reduce the chances that these higher-risk 
individuals would become over-indebted, though some of them 
would presumably seek financing from informal lenders.  Over time, 
such borrowers could establish a credit history that would reveal 
themselves to be less risky and would help them qualify for lower 
rates.  If these circumstances obtain, then the increased exposure to 
debt relief may effectively force creditors to allocate credit more effi-
ciently.  This likely would hurt most those lenders who do not have 
access to good information.  But formal lenders would have incen-
tives to invest in sophisticated credit scoring and in the evaluation of 
information, which would further help promote the expansion of 
consumer credit markets.  As discussed below, it is important to ac-
knowledge that expanding debt relief might not have these beneficial 
effects and, if not, it might significantly harm nascent consumer fi-
nancial markets. 
Consumer bankruptcy also may promote the expansion of con-
sumer financial markets by making individuals more willing to bor-
row in the first place.  This is an ex ante effect of the insurance func-
tion of debt relief, which effectively removes or lessens at least some 
of the risk of borrowing.  If consumers are aware of the protections 
afforded under bankruptcy law, and assuming that they are at least 
somewhat risk-averse, this should make borrowing somewhat more 
appealing or less forbidding. Assuming that at least some consumers 
would not choose to obtain credit—or as much credit—in the ab-
sence of bankruptcy protection, the availability of such protection 
should make consumers more willing to obtain and to use credit to 
become productive economic actors, to invest in durable goods, to 
invest in their own human capital, to use credit to smooth consump-
tion in the wake of income or expense shocks, and, perhaps, to be-
come more invested in their society’s growth and development.  As 
with almost all insurance, such protection can give rise to moral haz-
ard, increasing consumers’ incentives to borrow recklessly.107  It is 
 107 See, e.g., Charles G. Hallinan, supra note 16, at 100–03; Richard M. Hynes, Non-
Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 ILL. L. REV. 301, 329–31 (2004); Feibelman, supra note 
16, at 166–70. 
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therefore important that a consumer bankruptcy regime be designed 
to ensure that borrowers bear a significant portion of the risk of their 
own default.108
Finally, as Rajan and Zingales have argued,109 the availability of 
consumer bankruptcy law may help strengthen political support for 
development policies in indirect ways.  There is often significant po-
litical opposition to such policies, especially because these policies of-
ten involve serious social and financial risks.  For example,  privatiza-
tion of resources, including financial resources may disrupt existing 
financial relationships, create labor dislocations, lead to the disman-
tling of subsidies, and expose individuals and households to unfamil-
iar forms of risks and losses.  Individuals who experience such cir-
cumstances can easily become disenchanted with the policies 
responsible for their dislocation and losses.110  Social insurance, social 
assistance, and other types of safety net policies can help minimize 
these effects and perhaps reduce political opposition to development 
policies.111  Developing countries tend to have weak and informal 
safety nets to deal with these (hopefully) transitional dislocations and 
losses.112  To the extent that consumer bankruptcy strengthens a 
country’s safety net, it may soften the blow of economic expansion113 
and defuse the political obstacles to reforms that promote develop-
ment.114
B. Objections and Concerns 
If consumer bankruptcy with meaningful debt relief can have a 
beneficial effect in promoting economic growth and development, 
one might reasonably expect to see a global convergence toward this 
policy.  In particular, one might expect that consumer bankruptcy 
would be a common component of development policy in emerging 
economies with nascent consumer financial markets.  In fact, the re-
cent trends of consumer bankruptcy adoption and reform do not 
 108 See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 16, at 167–69 (noting that filing fees, limits on 
dischargeability, and limits on refiling are formal aspects of U.S. bankruptcy law that 
may reduce the moral hazard of debt relief in bankruptcy). 
 109 See, e.g., RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25. 
 110 See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm 
for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 37, 63, 78, 107 (1998). 
 111 See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 300–06; Rodrik, supra note 64, at 9–12. 
 112 See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 25, at 20 (“[N]ewly developed or developing 
countries are still reliant on informal safety nets that have frayed long ago under the 
onslaught of markets.”). 
 113 See id. at 301 (proposing that consumer bankruptcy law can serve an important 
role in supporting development policy). 
 114 See id. at 278 (describing a primarily political role for bankruptcy’s fresh start). 
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quite bear this out.  On the one hand, there has been a marked trend 
toward liberalizing debt relief and bankruptcy law across the globe.115 
The list of countries that have recently adopted or liberalized con-
sumer debt relief includes Australia,116 Norway,117 Finland,118 the 
United Kingdom,119 the Netherlands,120 France,121 Germany,122 Rus-
sia,123 Hong Kong,124 Israel,125 Portugal,126 South Korea,127 and Swe-
den.128  It is noteworthy that most of these countries enjoy rising per 
capita incomes and that most of them have adopted relatively modest 
measures of debt relief compared to the American fresh start ap-
proach.129  Perhaps more interesting, it appears that most of the 
countries that have recently adopted or reformed their bankruptcy 
regimes have done so in the wake of signs of increasing consumer 
over-indebtedness.130  Admittedly, it is extremely difficult and poten-
tially misleading to draw general, theoretical conclusions about the 
 115 See JOHANNA NIEMI-KIELSILAINEN & ANN-SOFIE HENRIKSON, BUREAU OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON LEGAL COOPERATION REPORT ON LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO DEBT 
PROBLEMS IN CREDIT SOCIETIES 41–42 (2005) (making recommendations supporting 
liberalized approach); Efrat, supra note 94, at 92–95; see also, Kilborn, supra note 96, 
at 7–8. 
 116 See generally Rosalind Mason & John Duns, Developments in Consumer Bankruptcy 
in Australia, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 227. 
 117 See Efrat, supra note 94, at 93. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See id.; Kilborn, supra note 96, at 8, 11, 16, 17. 
 121 See Efrat, supra note 94, at 93–94; Kilborn, supra note 96, at 8. 
 122 See Efrat, supra note 94, at 85 & n.15; see also Christopher G. Paulus, The New 
German Insolvency Code, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 141 (1998). 
 123 See Efrat, supra note 94, at 91, 94 & n.47 (noting that Russia adopted a federal 
insolvency law allowing for discharge of some obligations). 
 124 See generally Charles D. Booth, Current Trends in Consumer Insolvency in Hong 
Kong, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 187. 
 125 See generally Rafael Efrat, The Political Economy of Personal Bankruptcy in Israel, in 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 167. 
 126 See Efrat, supra note 94, at 86 & n.17; see also Maria Manuel Leitão Marques & 
Catarina Frade, Searching for an Over-Indebtedness Regulatory System for Portugal and the 
European Union, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 
121. 
 127 See generally Soogeun Oh, Personal Bankruptcy in Korea: Challenges and Responses, 
7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 597 (2006) [hereinafter Oh, Personal Bankruptcy]; Oh, supra 
note 9. 
 128 Kilborn, supra note 96, at 8. 
 129 See generally Efrat, supra note 94. 
 130 A number of writers have noted the fact that countries tend to adopt or reform 
consumer bankruptcy regimes in the wake of rising levels of consumer indebtedness.  
See, e.g., Efrat, supra note 94, at 92–95; Jason J Kilborn, Comparative Cause and Effect: 
Consumer Insolvency and the Eroding Social Safety Net, 14 COLUM. J. EUROP. L. (forthcom-
ing 2009); Kilborn, supra note 96, at 2–3.  
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benefits of consumer bankruptcy from these observations.  At the 
very least, however, these data may suggest that policymakers in those 
countries that have recently adopted or reformed consumer bank-
ruptcy laws have concluded that consumer bankruptcy can serve 
beneficial functions ex post, i.e., after significant numbers of con-
sumers and households have become over-indebted. 
On the other hand, a number of countries do not provide con-
sumers with any bankruptcy protection, including some of the largest 
developing countries: China, Vietnam, Brazil, Turkey, Mexico, Argen-
tina, Chile, and Venezuela.131  Brazil and China are particularly inter-
esting cases in this regard.  Rates of consumer lending have increased 
dramatically in both countries in recent years.132 As noted above, it 
appears that this increase in consumer borrowing is at least partly a 
product of domestic policies designed to increase consumption of 
domestic goods and services.133  Not surprisingly, there is increasing 
evidence of consumer over-indebtedness in both countries.134  None-
theless, while both countries have bankruptcy regimes for commer-
cial entities, neither has adopted a regime available for consumer 
debtors.135  Brazil does have a civil insolvency process available to con-
sumer debtors, but it appears to be primarily, or perhaps exclusively, 
a creditors’ remedy and does not provide meaningful debt relief.136  
China recently adopted its corporate bankruptcy regime, but policy-
 131 See Efrat, supra note 94, at 82–84. 
 132 Consumer lending has been growing dramatically in Brazil since the 1970s, es-
pecially in recent years.  See, e.g., de Lima Lopes, supra note 9, in CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 86–89; Marques & Benjamin, su-
pra note 9, at 1.  Consumer lending has been increasing dramatically in China in re-
cent years, but it is still a nascent market—consumer credit accounted for approxi-
mately one percent of bank loans at the turn of the century.  See, e.g., Zhang, supra 
note 9, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 109 (“De-
spite impressive growth in recent years, the consumer credit market [in China] is still 
in its infancy stages.”). 
 133 Under Deng Xiaoping, “the basis of the national development [in China] has 
slowly shifted from production to consumerism.”  Zhang, supra note 9, in CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 106.  The government in China 
has tried to encourage consumer borrowing, but there is weakness in both supply of 
and demand for credit.  See id. at 109.  Acquisition of durables in Brazil has been 
“generally stimulated by public polic[y].”  de Lima Lopes, supra note 9, in CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 98. 
 134 See Zhang, supra note 9, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, su-
pra note 9, at 112 (discussing over-indebtedness in China); Marques & Benjamin, su-
pra note 9, at 6 (discussing over-indebtedness in Brazil). 
 135 Bankruptcy law in Brazil applies only to for-profit corporations and sole-
proprietors.  See de Lima Lopes, supra note 9, at 91; Marques & Benjamin, supra note 
9, at 1. 
 136 See de Lima Lopes, supra note 9, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 93. “[T]his procedure is seldom used.”  Id. at 93. 
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makers specifically decided not to extend the regime to consumer 
debtors.137
Like China and Brazil, India has experienced dramatic expan-
sion of consumer lending in recent decades.138  And although India 
has extended bankruptcy protection to consumers since its colonial 
era, it has not meaningfully reformed or modernized this regime 
since it was put in place.  There is strong evidence that this system, 
like India’s judicial system in general, is extremely slow and rather 
unpredictable.139  The country has recently adopted reforms to its 
corporate insolvency laws to address these and other problems, but it 
has not adopted reforms to its colonial-era insolvency laws that apply 
to individuals.140  As in Brazil and China, there is evidence of increas-
ing over-indebtedness among Indian households.141  In 2005, the Re-
serve Bank of India instituted a settlement program for small non-
performing loans.142 That same year, the Indian Law Commission cre-
ated a committee to explore whether to reform the country’s con-
sumer insolvency regime.143  That committee disbanded without mak-
ing any formal recommendations. 
 137 See Zhang, supra note 9, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, su-
pra note 9, at 115.  There have been some calls by scholars and advocates within the 
country for a consumer bankruptcy regime.  See id. at 112–19.  But these have appar-
ently not generated much official support.  Id.   
 138 See generally Adam Feibelman, Consumer Finance, Development Policy, and the Case 
of India (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 139 See, e.g., Armour & Lele, supra note 81, at 3. 
 140 See id. at 24–25. 
 141 It appears, for example, that default rates in the country are rising.  See Y. 
VENUGOPAL REDDY, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, ANNUAL POLICY STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR 
2007–08, at 26 (2007).  It also appears that growing over-indebtedness is increasingly 
becoming a matter of concern for legal and regulatory actors in India, especially the 
Reserve Bank of India.  See generally Feibelman, supra note 138, at 52–53.  There is al-
so anecdotal evidence of growing over-indebtedness in the form of high-profile legal 
disputes of consumer debt collection.  See, e.g., Parinda.com ICICI Personal Loan Cus-
tomer Commits Suicide after Alleged Harassment by Recovery Agents, http://www. 
parinda.com/news/crime/20070918/2025/icici-personal-loan-customer-commits-sui 
cide-after-alleged-harassment-recov (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).  In a recent case, 
ICICI Bank v. Kaur, Justice Lakshmanan of the Supreme Court of India refers to “the 
enormous amount of litigation pending and being filed against the banks” arising 
from the action of their collection agents.  (2007) 2 M.L.J. 854 (S.C.). 
 142 See Letter from G. Srinivasan, Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Reserve Bank 
of India, to All Regional Rural Banks (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http:// 
http://www.rbi.org.in/commonman/Upload/English/Notification/PDFs/88920.pd
f; see also Letter from G. Srinivasan, Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Reserve Bank 
of India, to All Scheduled Commercial Banks (Dec. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.rbi.org.in/commonman/Upload/English/Notification/PDFs/67937.pdf. 
 143 See INSOLINDIA, http://www.insolindia.com/activities.htm#4 (last visited Jan. 
1, 2008). 
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Assuming that countries like Brazil, China, and India are experi-
encing increasing consumer over-indebtedness, it is not clear what 
lessons to draw from the fact that policymakers in these countries ap-
pear to have considered embracing consumer bankruptcy law or 
modernizing existing regimes yet decided not to do so.  Again, it is 
important to be cautious in deriving theoretical insights from a hand-
ful of historically contingent circumstances.  That said, the experi-
ence of these countries may suggest that their policymakers believe—
rightly or wrongly—that such a regime would not provide net ex post 
or ex ante benefits.  They may have determined, for example, that 
the potential ex post benefits discussed above are slight or that the 
threshold costs of necessary legal reforms are too high.  Alternatively, 
it is possible that consumer over-indebtedness in these countries has 
not yet reached a point to justify the cost of adopting or reforming 
consumer bankruptcy. 
In any event, it is worth emphasizing that the experiences in 
Brazil, China, and India reflect a consistent aspect of consumer bank-
ruptcy policy across the globe: relatively few countries adopt or sig-
nificantly reform consumer bankruptcy regimes while their consumer 
financial markets are nascent or before they experience widespread 
consumer over-indebtedness.  Admittedly, this may be strong evi-
dence against the claim, asserted above, that consumer bankruptcy 
can promote the expansion of consumer financial markets in devel-
oping economies.  It may reflect that there is, in fact, no ex ante ben-
efit to bankruptcy law with meaningful debt relief.  This could be 
true, for example, if bankruptcy regimes do not solve collective action 
problems among consumer lenders—if, for example, creditors would 
not likely recover more from their debtors under bankruptcy law 
than they would in the absence of a bankruptcy regime.  It is also pos-
sible that expanded bankruptcy protection might not make consum-
ers more willing to borrow in the first place.  It could be the case that 
social and cultural factors affect consumers’ willingness to borrow 
more than the availability of debt relief.144
The experience of these countries may also reflect concerns that 
a consumer bankruptcy regime with meaningful debt relief would 
harm nascent credit markets more than help them.  Such a regime 
could impose actual harm on an economy if it ends up disrupting 
vulnerable new consumer credit markets.  Like most substantive regu-
lation of credit, debt relief imposes some cost on creditors,145 which 
 144 See infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
 145 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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creditors will pass on to debtors by raising the cost of credit or by lim-
iting the availability of credit.  Creditors in developing economies 
may not be able to evaluate the costs of an automatic stay or the risk 
of discharge of their obligations under bankruptcy law.  And, as 
noted above, debtors might respond to the availability of debt relief 
by acting more opportunistically or by becoming less disciplined in 
borrowing.146  Any of these effects could cause creditors to increase 
significantly the cost of credit.  This could seriously limit the expan-
sion of consumer lending, which would foreclose any potential bene-
fits of deepening consumer financial markets described in Part I. 
It is just as likely, however, that the developing world’s relative 
lack of enthusiasm for consumer bankruptcy law may reflect that pol-
icymakers in these countries are simply skeptical about its potential 
benefits.  This is not at all unreasonable given that there is surpris-
ingly little data about the effects of bankruptcy on consumer behavior 
and on the pricing of credit.  Policymakers may be willing to adopt or 
to reform bankruptcy law in their country yet refuse to do so in the 
absence of strong evidence of beneficial effects.  Countries with 
emerging economies that are highly vulnerable to the consequences 
of policy mistakes may be especially hesitant to adopt or to modernize 
consumer bankruptcy regimes without strong evidence of such bene-
fits. 
Even if policymakers in a developing country are confident that 
a modern consumer bankruptcy regime would be beneficial in their 
context, there may still be political factors or a general lack of domes-
tic receptivity that cause them to resist legal reforms.  It is entirely 
possible, for example, that countries will avoid providing or improv-
ing consumer bankruptcy protections due to intractable political op-
position.  Powerful actors may oppose even ex ante efficient rules if 
their interests are short-term and the benefits of reform are long-
term.  Some creditors may be confident, for example, that they can 
recover their obligations more consistently than other creditors un-
der the prevailing regime.  Some may be concerned that an expand-
ing market for consumer finance would invite new entrants to the 
market and may want to reduce the threat of such competition.  If 
there is such political opposition to consumer bankruptcy law, there 
is unlikely to be an equally powerful constituency clamoring in favor 
of such reforms.  Even if consumers or their advocates are an organ-
ized and powerful domestic political force, they are not likely to be 
focused on the potential ex ante benefits of consumer bankruptcy.  
 146 See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
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Because the academic community has not examined the potential 
development role of consumer bankruptcy and international finan-
cial institutions do not advise developing countries to consider it, it is 
unlikely that domestic policymakers will experience much, if any, ex-
ternal pressure to do so. 
Setting aside such political obstacles, institutional and/or cul-
tural factors within a country may undermine the theoretical benefits 
of a consumer bankruptcy regime.  As the history of law and devel-
opment movements illustrate, a legal institution that is theoretically 
beneficial in general or in some contexts will often not be effective in 
other settings.  There is a robust and growing literature on the chal-
lenges of transplanting legal regimes from one society to others.147  As 
a general matter, this literature emphasizes that a society must be re-
ceptive to legal reforms for them to be effective.  It must have the in-
stitutional capacity to support the legal regime in question, and there 
must be domestic demand for the reform.  Policymakers in develop-
ing economies may be justifiably concerned that their societies will 
not be receptive to adopting or to reforming consumer bankruptcy 
law in either sense. 
Developing economies should not invest time and resources in 
adopting or reforming a consumer bankruptcy regime if it is not ca-
pable of providing an administrative structure for the regime.  Almost 
all of the benefits of bankruptcy law described above depend on the 
regime being at least minimally effective—relatively timely, if not 
speedy, and generally predictable.  If a consumer bankruptcy regime 
is not effective in these ways, it is unlikely to provide any of its poten-
tial benefits.  Consumers may not, for example, believe that they will 
derive any benefit from the regime.  This likely would undermine the 
potential for a bankruptcy regime to encourage consumers to borrow 
in the first place, and it likely would do little to help them avoid emo-
tional and physical costs of financial distress.  It also would not do 
much to assuage their concerns about broader dislocations caused by 
their country’s development policies.  Similarly, an ineffective regime 
would not be likely to increase creditors’ insolvency-state returns or 
make their returns more predictable.  If a consumer bankruptcy re-
gime fails in these respects, it will be unlikely to support the deepen-
 147 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974); Berkowitz et al., supra note 
66; Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 111 (1997); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Compara-
tive Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 7 (1994); Troy A. Paredes, A Sys-
tems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the 
Answer, 45 WM. MARY L. REV. 1055 (2004). 
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ing of consumer financial markets.  In fact, an ineffective regime 
could have a dramatically negative effect on creditors if it provides for 
generous but unpredictable debt relief.  In that case, creditors might 
charge a price for credit that significantly over-estimates their actual 
exposure to debt-relief, or they might simply decide not to participate 
in the market. 
Policymakers in developing countries may also determine that 
there is not adequate domestic demand for such reforms.  Expansion 
of consumer bankruptcy is often fraught with social, cultural, and 
ideological implications.148  In particular, financial distress and dis-
charge of obligations are stigmatized in most societies to some extent.  
In societies where such stigma is very strongly felt, debt relief under 
bankruptcy law or other laws may have little effect.  Individuals in 
these societies may not be willing to employ the legal rules at their 
disposal.  This phenomenon is arguably observable to some extent in 
the United States, where many individuals who would benefit from 
filing for bankruptcy do not do so.149  As Martin explores in detail, the 
example of Japan is striking in this regard.150  Although that country 
has adopted relatively generous consumer bankruptcy protection 
modeled largely on the U.S. system, the regime is rarely used.151  This 
is apparently due, in large part, to social stigmas attaching to debt re-
lief in that country.152
It is important to note that it is possible for policymakers to ad-
dress or reduce many of the objections or obstacles to adopting con-
sumer bankruptcy law in a developing country discussed above.  It is 
possible to reduce the effects of debt relief in bankruptcy on the 
price of credit, for example, by circumscribing the availability of such 
relief.  Limiting the scope of available discharge or increasing the 
preconditions for debt relief should reduce creditors’ exposure to 
bankruptcy law by reducing the ability and incentives of consumers to 
act opportunistically.  Policymakers may also address these risks by 
improving the quality of domestic credit reporting and credit scoring.  
 148 See generally Efrat, supra note 62; Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture 
in developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2005); Zhang, supra note 9, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
IN GOLBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 118–19 (discussing cultural aversion to debt 
in China); Oh, Personal Bankruptcy, supra note 127, at 32–33 (discussing consumers’ 
reluctance to utilize bankruptcy relief due to social stigma). 
 149 See, e.g., Michelle White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1998). 
 150 See Martin, supra note 148, at 59–60. 
 151 See id. at 60. 
 152 See id. 
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This should increase the cost to consumers of filing for bankruptcy 
and thereby reduce their incentives to act opportunistically.  It is also 
likely that informal forces such as stigma or reputation will limit the 
extent to which borrowers behave opportunistically, especially in so-
cieties where the stigma associated with financial distress and debt re-
lief are robust. 
Similarly, it may be possible for policymakers to influence cul-
tural or social factors within their country to increase the social de-
mand for or reduce the social resistance to consumer bankruptcy 
law.153  They may be able to do so by identifying familiar forms of debt 
relief and building a bankruptcy regime upon those indigenous insti-
tutions.  They might also invest in financial education that casts a 
sympathetic light on debt relief.  This may be easier to do in coun-
tries that already have some, albeit poorly-functioning, form of insol-
vency or bankruptcy law on their books, such as Brazil and India.  It is 
doubtful that policymakers could eliminate or radically alter stigmas 
associated with debt relief in societies that have strong norms disfa-
voring debt or debt relief, but they might be able to reduce resistance 
enough to make it possible to adopt or expand bankruptcy protec-
tion for consumers.  Finally, social demand for debt relief and con-
sumer bankruptcy protection may be fluid—as levels of over-
indebtedness rise, for example, this will likely influence citizens’ and 
policymakers’ receptiveness to the institution.  This may help explain 
why recent reforms and adoptions have tended to occur in countries 
that have experienced such problems. 
It may be harder, yet possible, to reduce the administrative 
and/or institutional obstacles to implementing a modern bankruptcy 
regime.  Even if a country’s judicial system is weak or flawed, however, 
it might be possible and desirable to design a consumer bankruptcy 
system that is somewhat insulated from judicial functions.  Policy-
makers could, for example, adopt relatively formalistic bankruptcy 
rules that require only limited judicial discretion or attention.154  If 
speed, predictability, and accessibility are primary concerns, it may be 
 153 In recent years, a number of writers have proposed that promoting social and 
cultural change is an essential component of development policy.  For an extensive 
discussion and critique of this body of work, see Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture 
in Law and Development, BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  Any attempt to influence 
or change social or cultural aspects of a society will inevitably be fraught with practi-
cal challenges and deep normative concerns.  With these challenges and concerns in 
mind, this Article only tentatively suggests that policy-makers may be in a position to 
influence social and cultural factors within their own societies and that they are more 
likely to be successful in such efforts if they are attentive to social and cultural di-
mensions of existing domestic institutions. 
 154 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 70, at 3. 
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possible to create a distinct bankruptcy forum that is more adminis-
trative and less judicial in nature.  Building institutional capacity and 
increasing social receptivity might be interrelated projects.  The en-
actment of a consumer bankruptcy regime may, in itself, influence 
social demand or receptiveness to the institution, even if it is under-
utlilized for a while.  And increasing demand for consumer bank-
ruptcy may help build political support for making broader im-
provements in domestic legal and judicial institutions. 
In sum, there are good reasons to believe that a consumer bank-
ruptcy regime can support the beneficial expansion of consumer fi-
nance and reduce the overall risks and costs of consumer borrowing.  
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence bearing on these 
claims.  The reluctance of many developing countries to adopt such 
regimes, except in the wake of widespread over-indebtedness or fi-
nancial crises, may suggest that these claims are incorrect.  Alterna-
tively, it may indicate that policymakers may misperceive the benefits 
of such reforms or that they face practical obstacles to introducing or 
expanding bankruptcy protections for consumers.  If policymakers 
are limited by practical obstacles, these need not be determinative; it 
may be possible to increase a country’s institutional and social recep-
tiveness to consumer bankruptcy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Existing scholarship on law, finance, and development generally 
ignores the role that consumer finance and the regulation thereof 
might play in promoting economic development.  In fact, there are 
good reasons to believe that deepening of consumer finance pro-
motes growth and/or development in emerging economies.  Regula-
tion of consumer lending may support these effects by helping to ex-
pand the availability of consumer finance and by addressing the 
potential costs of over-indebtedness.  Consumer bankruptcy law that 
includes meaningful debt relief has the potential to be an effective 
form of such regulation.  It can help promote deepening of con-
sumer financial markets by increasing the expected insolvency re-
turns of creditors, by making such returns more predictable, and by 
encouraging risk-averse consumers to obtain finance.  It can also limit 
the amount and the costs of consumer over-indebtedness.  Thus, con-
sumer bankruptcy law should be understood as a potentially key 
component of development policy, and not only in the wake of wide-
spread over-indebtedness or financial crisis.  Unless it appears that a 
society cannot effectively administer such a regime or that social or 
cultural factors would keep consumers from utilizing it, emerging 
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economies should consider adopting a consumer bankruptcy system 
or modernizing their existing regimes. 
